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## ISSUES FOR NSC U.S. SPACE LAUNCH STRATEGY NSDD

## Background

- Meeting is culmination of deliberations on national space launch recovery since Challenger disaster. SIG (Space) reviewed issue.
- ° D/ICS represented you on SIG (Space) and ICS served on this working group
  - ° The agenda is:

- Introduction John M. Poindexter
-- Background (10 minutes)
-- Issues for Decisions

- Senior Interagency Group Gerald M. May (NSC) Study Findings (15 minutes)

- OMB Funding Options Randall Davis (OMB) (5 minutes)

- Discussion All participants (25 minutes)

- Summary John M. Poindexter (5 minutes)

## Potential Issue #1: Commercial Space Transportation

- $^{\circ}$  Competition with U.S. industry is  $\underline{\text{not}}$  STS but rather ARIANE V and other foreign launchers
- Because of large up-front costs (\$1B) and market uncertainties, U.S. industry must have tangible incentive to make required investment
- ° Incentive begins with NSDD policy and may involve Government support during development
- National security significantly benefits from commercial medium-range lift capability for small payload satellites
- ° Position: A competitive commercial expendable launch vehicle capability is of first-order national importance

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° Postponing the procurement of a fourth orbiter in favor of developing n STS follow—on system would mandate reliance on an orbiter fleet with little r no backup for 7 - 10 years	
° Position: A fourth orbiter is in the best interests of national ecurity even though it would be based on dated technology	_
otential Issue #3: Delay in Vandenberg Shuttle Launch Complex Operational apability	
° Discussion of Vandenberg <u>not</u> included in draft NSDD	
° NASA may want to introduce wording in NSDD to require VAFB capability	
NASA view is that any decision to delay VAFB can be read as reducing ational security commitment to shuttle program and undermines fourth orbiter rocurement	
° Position: Should resist as not required in the policy document	
Specific wording reduces future flexibility	
Current Vandenberg mothball proposal maximizes operational capability at Kennedy in the near term	
Vandenberg could be reactivated when new fourth orbiter becomes operational and in time to support national security launch (October 1991)	
otential Issue #4: Supplemental Funding Approaches	
Overlaying the entire discussion is how to nay for the supplemental	

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to recover from Challenger accident

25X1

- ° OMB position is that DOD and NASA should identify offsets to fund
  - OMB alleges that NASA has identified offsets
  - Messrs. Weinberger/Taft strongly resist coming up with offsets
- ° Position: Support DOD in this area as offset drill may require sources from NFIP

## Potential Issue #5: Whether the Draft NSDD Should "Supercede" or "Update" NSDD 164 - National Security Launch Strategy

- ° NSDD 164, dated 25 February 1985, outlines in very specific terms shuttle launch rates (24/year), DOD share of launches (at least one-third of available STS flights) and pricing policy
- ° NASA favors using "updates" wording to keep basic tenets of this policy in tact
- ° DOD believes this document should supercede the certain paragraphs dealing with the above specifics
- ° NSDD 164 was the source for press allegations that the White House put pressure on NASA to maintain artificial flight rate ("24/year")
- ° Flight rates and pricing policy will undoubtedly change as a result of Challenger aftermath and TITAN accidents
- ° Position: If raised, support DOD in inserting "supercedes paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of NSDD 164" vice "updates . . ." as this will preserve your flexibility for operational requirements and cost-effective launch options